Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, an individual, Mediocode, Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Does I through V: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, an individual,
Mediocode, Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and
Does I through V: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel D. McVey; Randy T. Austin; Kirton and McConkie.
Stephen G. Crockett; Wesley D. Felix; Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger and Peterson.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, England v. Horbach, No. 940695 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6307
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAN C ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual, 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 940695-CA 
(Priority No. 15) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Wesley D. Felix 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Randy T. Austin (A6171) 
KIRTON & McCONKTE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
JAM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual, 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 940695-CA 
(Priority No. 15) 
BRIEF OF PIAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Wesley D. Felix 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Randy T. Austin (A6171) 
KTRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 2 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
L BECAUSE CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED DEFENDANTS PROMISE, 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 10 
H. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NO 
CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED THE SUBSTITUTE AGREEMENT 
AND THAT THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION 12 
m. EVEN IF NO CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED THE AGREEMENT, 
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM REFUSING 
TO HONOR THE AGREEMENT 15 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING 
DEFENDANT TO PURSUE A COUNTERCLAIM RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON THE EVE OF TRIAL 16 
A. Defendant Has No Reasonable Excuse for Failure to Amend the 
Pleadings to Include a Counterclaim Before the Day of Trial 18 
B. Plaintiff Was Surprised and Prejudiced by the Court's Permitting the 
Amendment 19 
C Plaintiff Did Not Consent to the Amendment of the Pleadings by 
Allowing in the Evidence Relating to Overpayment 20 
CONCLUSION 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 
656 P.2d 988 (Utah 1982) 16 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) 16 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988) 16, 17 
EA. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 
522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974) 15 
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Higgins, 
89 P.2d 916 (Kan. 1939) 12 
Girard v. Appleby, 
660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) 16, 17, 18 
Glitsos v. Radish, 
418 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966) 15 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 
699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985) 12 
Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 
553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976) 13 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 
834 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct App. 1992) 2, 10 
In re Grimm, 
784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989) 10, 12, 14 
Long v. Forbes, 
136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943) 12 
ii 
Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992) 
Powers Restaurants, Inc. v. Garrison, 
465 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1970) 
Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 
648 P.2d 267 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) 
State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 
Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 
610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980) 
Trafton v. Youngblood, 
442 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1968) 
Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) 
Constitutions. Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
Utah R. App. Proc. 4 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a) 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Addendum ("Add") 1. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
L Did the district court err in concluding that the 2% agreement did not constitute an accord 
and satisfaction of Eugene Horbach ("Defendant") and Lan England's ("Plaintiff") original 
agreement? Whether an accord and satisfaction exists presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
The court reviews underlying factual conclusions for clear error, and the application of the law to 
the facts under the correction of error standard. See Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 
P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct App. 1992). 
II. Did the district court err in concluding that there was no consideration for Defendant's 
promise to hold 2% of the stock of Medicode, Inc. in trust for Plaintiff because the parties were 
mutually mistaken as to whether any amount was due Plaintiff? Whether there is consideration 
is a mixed question of law and fact. The court reviews underlying factual conclusions for clear 
error, and the application of the law to the facts under the correction of error standard. See State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). 
HI. Should the Defendant be estopped from denying his promise to hold 2% of the stock for 
Plaintiff? This question presents a mixed question of law and fact. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1269. 
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IV. Did the district court err in permitting Defendant to amend the pleadings to include a 
counterclaim at the close of evidence at trial? The standard of review on this issue is abuse of 
discretion. See Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rule is pertinent to this appeal: 
. . . [A] party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
Rule 15(a) U.R.CP. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract against the Defendant. Plaintiff alleged 
that Defendant had failed to transfer 2% of the stock of Medicode, Inc. to Plaintiff on demand 
as promised to conclude a stock purchase between the parties. See Record ("R.") 2-17; Add. 
2-17. (Citations to "R" are citations to the original record; the "Add." cites refer to the page 
numbers of the Addendum.) At the end of trial, the Defendant moved to amend the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence not specifically mentioning a counterclaim against the Plaintiff for 
alleged overpayments on the underlying stock purchase contract. The Court ruled no cause of 
action on Plaintiffs complaint and awarded Defendant $169,501.75 on the counterclaim. Plaintiff 
appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late 1989 or early 1990, Defendant and Plaintiff reached an agreement whereby 
Defendant agreed to purchase 258,363 shares of Medicode stock from Plaintiff. (R. 488 lines 15, 
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489 lines 1-6, 490; Add. 56-58). The parties agreed that the purchase price for the shares was 
$2.75 per share or $710,498.25. (R. 256, 11 4, 488-89, 531; Add. 42, 56-57, 74). Plaintiff testified, 
and Defendant did not dispute, that the purchase money was to be paid within two to three 
months during the first quarter of 1990. (R. 490-91, 494, 506 line 25-507 line 5, 368-69; Add. 58-
59, 62, 65-66, 74, 48-49). Over the next several months the Defendant made payments, but he 
failed to pay Plaintiff the purchase money within the time frame agreed. Id. Indeed, the 
testimony at trial indicated that payments were received through at least September 1990. (R. 256, 
MI 6-7; Add. 42). In May of 1991, Plaintiff and Defendant met to come to an agreement with 
respect to wrapping up the deal. (Id. at f 10, R. 505-507, 372-73; Add. 64-66, 50-51, 42). Plaintiff 
still had possession of the stock and believed, in good faith, that Defendant owed him $25,000.00. 
(R. 505-06, 517-18; Add. 64-65, 71-72). He also believed that Defendant had breached their 
original agreement by failing to pay for the stock within the period agreed. (R. 491-494, 504-07, 
256 f 11, 368-69, 373, 382-83; Add. 59-62, 63-66, 42, 48-49, 51, 52-53). At the May meeting, 
Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement whereby Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff an 
additional $25,000.00 and hold 2% of the stock of Medicode in trust for Plaintiff. (R. 15, 257-
58,1 12, 505-08; Add. 15, 43-44, 64-67). Plaintiff on the other hand, agreed to transfer the stock 
to Defendant immediately and gave up his rights to sue for breach of the original agreement. (R. 
382-84, 517-19; Add. 52-54, 71-73). Both Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that Plaintiff would not 
have transferred the stock to Defendant if Defendant had not agreed to pay an additional 
$25,000.00 and hold 2% of the stock for Plaintiff. (R. 584-85, 590; Add. 78-80). Moreover, both 
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parties testified that they both believed money was still owing under the original contract. (R. 577, 
584; Add. 77-78). 
In December 1992, Plaintiff made a demand for the 2% of Medicode stock. (R. 16-17, 
512-13; Add. 16-17, 68-69). Defendant refused to honor the May 1991 agreement. R. 513-14; 
Add. 69-70. Despite the fact that Defendant admitted to executing the agreement (R. 584 lines 
8-14; Add. 78), and the fact that the agreement states unequivocally that Defendant will hold 2% 
of the stock for Plaintiff, (R. 15; Add. 15), the district court ruled that Plaintiff could not enforce 
the agreement because no consideration supported it. (R. 438-42; Add. 85-89). The court held 
that at the time of the agreement the parties were under a mutual mistake that money was still 
owed on the original agreement. Id. The court dismissed Plaintiffs claim. The court committed 
legal error in dismissing Plaintiffs claim. 
Adding insult to injury, the court also ruled that Defendant had overpaid the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $169,501.75 for the stock and allowed Defendant to recover the money on a 
counterclaim that was raised during trial. The parties disputed the purpose for several of the 
payments from Defendant to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the amounts were for services 
rendered and were paid in connection with other deals that the parties had entered previously. 
The court found Plaintiffs claim for approximately $169,501.75 in services was incredible because 
no documentation supported it. This, despite the fact that Plaintiff and Defendant had no 
documentation to support the original stock purchase transaction of $700,000.00. Moreover, 
Plaintiff was not given ample, if any, opportunity to prepare his case on the overpayments due 
to Defendant's lack of diligence in "discovering" the evidence. Plaintiff has, since trial, located 
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documentary evidence that would substantiate his claims regarding the purpose for the disputed 
payments. Plaintiff was not able to locate this evidence prior to trial because Plaintiff failed to 
raise the prospect of a counterclaim or the defense of full payment until just prior to trial. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on March 15, 1993. (R. 2-17; Add. 2-17). 
Plaintiff requested a jury trial in his complaint. Id. Defendant filed an answer on April 30, 1993. 
(R. 35-39; Add. 18-22). Defendant raised several defenses in his answer but never mentioned 
mutual mistake or lack of consideration as defenses. Id. Moreover, absolutely no mention was 
made of any potential counterclaim or off-set. Id. After several months, the court set a trial date 
in this matter for December 21, 1993. (R. 168; Add. 23). One week before trial, on December 
14, 1993, Defendant filed a motion for a continuance of the trial date and for leave to file a 
counterclaim, claiming that he had discovered new evidence and needed time to develop the 
evidence. (R. 184-188; Add. 24-28). Defendant argued that the "new" evidence may give rise to 
a counterclaim. (R. 186; Add. 26). The court denied the motion because failure to discover the 
evidence earlier was due to lack of diligence on Defendant's part. (R. 199, 193-97; Add. 34, 29-
33) (court indicated that the motion was denied for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs brief in 
opposition, and Plaintiff argued that the failure to discover the evidence was due to lack of 
diligence on Defendant's part). Later, because a conflict arose in the court's schedule, the court 
postponed the trial until March 23, 1994. (R. 204; Add. 35). At or about the time that Defendant 
asked for the continuance, he argued for the first time, but never in formal pleadings, that he had 
paid Plaintiff in fiill under their original agreement. In his motion for a continuance, Defendant 
also asked the court for leave to amend his answer to include a counterclaim, and the court denied 
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the request (R. 199; Add. 34). Due to the postponement of the trial, Plaintiff was made aware 
that Defendant intended to introduce evidence that he had paid Plaintiff in full in defense of 
Plaintiffs claim, and Plaintiff did not object to the defense being raised. 
As the March 23rd trial date neared, once again Defendant began to "discover" new 
evidence. Defendant now claimed that he had recently discovered records revealing that he had 
substantially overpaid Plaintiff Plaintiff maintained that the payments were related to other deals 
between the parties. Still Defendant indicated that he intended to introduce evidence of 
overpayment in response to Plaintiffs claim, but gave no indication that he intended to pursue a 
counterclaim to recover amounts allegedly overpaid.1 Defendant filed a trial brief on March 22, 
1994, the day before trial in this matter, in which he raised for the first time since the court's 
denial of his motion for a continuance and leave to file a counterclaim, any intention of pursuing 
a counterclaim to recover the alleged overpayments. (R. 229 & n. K 13; Add. 38). Plaintiff filed 
a trial brief the day of trial, which did not address Defendant's counterclaim or any defenses 
thereto because Plaintiff did not know that Defendant intended to pursue a counterclaim until the 
day of trial when Defendant handed Plaintiff the trial brief.2 (R. 232-39; Add., 890-97). The 
1
 At the final pretrial conference, Horbach's attorneys indicated that he intended to introduce 
evidence of overpayment but gave no indication that they intended to bring a counterclaim to 
recover the alleged overpayments. England believed that the evidence would be introduced to 
support Horbach's defense of lack of consideration for the substitute agreement. 
2
 Plaintiff was aware that Defendant intended to defend against the Plaintiffs claim by 
introducing evidence of overpayment and claiming thereby that he had paid the full purchase price 
of the stock prior to the execution of the substitute agreement and that no consideration supported 
the agreement. However, Plaintiff had absolutely no notice that Horbach intended to pursue a 
counterclaim to recover amounts allegedly overpaid. Horbach had given some indication in the 
weeks prior to the first trial date that he believed that he had overpaid England $25,000.00. He 
asked for leave to file a counterclaim at that time which was denied. R. 199. No further mention 
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court will note that Plaintiffs Trial Brief addresses the law on all the issues before the Court, but 
does not mention any counterclaim. 
Defendant admits that he raised his counterclaim for the first time in his trial brief and 
when he asked the court to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence at the close of the 
trial. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, at p. 3; Add. 83-84. Plaintiff did not consent to the amendment of the pleadings to 
include a counterclaim. Plaintiff was surprised and prejudiced by the court's allowing Defendant 
to pursue a counterclaim at trial. Despite the fact that Plaintiff had never been put on notice that 
Defendant intended to pursue a counterclaim, the court permitted Defendant's requested 
amendment at the close of evidence and awarded the Defendant $169,501.75 on the counterclaim. 
The court abused its discretion in allowing the counterclaim to be brought. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court erred in concluding that because the parties were mistaken about the amount 
and whether money was due Plaintiff that no consideration supported the May 23,1991 agreement. 
Courts have held that settlement of a bona fide dispute is consideration, even if the dispute is not 
well-founded. 
At the May 23, 1991 meeting, Plaintiff believed in good faith that he was still owed money 
and that defendant had failed to pay for the stock as agreed. Defendant wanted to secure 
was made of a counterclaim until Horbach filed his trial brief the day before trial. The week of 
trial Horbach indicated that "new evidence" revealed that the amount he had overpaid England 
was $300,000.00. At trial, Horbach recovered about $170,000.00 on his counterclaim. Plaintiff was 
barely given an opportunity to hear of Defendant's claims before trial much less an opportunity to 
prepare to meet them. 
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immediate delivery of the stock. Accordingly, the parties entered an accord and satisfaction in 
which Defendant agreed to pay $25,000.00 and hold 2% of the Medicode stock in trust for 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed to immediate delivery of the stock and gave up his rights to rescind 
or sue for breach. The fact that Plaintiffs belief may have been mistaken does not mean that no 
consideration supported Defendant's promise. Defendant's promise was supported by consideration 
and should be enforced. 
Even if the Court were to conclude that no consideration supported Defendant's promise, 
the Court should rule that Defendant is estopped from denying it. Defendant made a promise to 
induce action on Plaintiffs part; Plaintiff reasonably relied on the promise, to his detriment. 
Defendant got what he wanted from his promise-the immediately delivery of the stock-and should 
be forced to honor his promise. 
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by amending the pleadings to include a 
counterclaim raised at trial. While amendment of the pleadings are generally liberally permitted, 
amendments to include new or different causes of action are highly disfavored. Defendant gave 
no good reason for failing to bring the counterclaim earlier, and Plaintiff, surprised and prejudiced 
by the claim, was given no time to prepare to meet it, and did not consent to it. Accordingly, the 
court abused its discretion by permitting the Defendant to pursue a counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
The questions of whether there was consideration for the May 1991 agreement, and 
whether the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction present mixed questions of law and 
fact. The court must accept the findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but reviews the 
application of the law to the facts for legal error. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 
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(Utah 1993); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The facts of this case reveal that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no accord and 
satisfaction because there was no consideration to support the May 1991 agreement 
I. BECAUSE CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED DEFENDANTS PROMISE, THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
"An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract mutually agree that a 
performance different than that required by the original contract will be made in substitution of 
the performance originally agreed upon and that the substituted agreement calling for a different 
performance will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement." Neiderhauser 
Builders v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1992). Compromise of a bona fide dispute, 
even though not well-founded or based on a mistaken assumption can constitute consideration for 
an accord and satisfaction. In re Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989). "Where the 
underlying claim is disputed or uncertain, the obligors assent to the definite statement of 
performance in the accord amounts to sufficient consideration." Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court has also expressly 
recognized the "modern trend among courts . . . to uphold such agreements [accords and 
satisfactions] wherever possible." Id. "[Consideration is often found in the obligor's agreement to 
alter the means or method of payment of the obligation initially owed." Id. That is precisely what 
occurred in this case. Here, the parties entered into an accord and satisfaction. 
It is undisputed that Defendant and Plaintiff initially agreed that Defendant would pay 
$2.75 per share for Plaintiffs shares of Medicode stock. (R. 256, 11 4; Add. 42). Plaintiffs 
undisputed testimony was that the purchase money was to be paid in the first two to three months 
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of 1990. (R. 490-91, 494, 506-07, 368-69; Add. 58-59, 62, 65-66, 48-49). The money was not paid 
as agreed. (R. 494, 368-69; Add. 62, 48-49). In May 1991, Plaintiff and Defendant met to wrap 
up the stock sale. At that meeting, the parties changed the agreed-upon performance. Defendant 
agreed to pay $25,000.00 and give Plaintiff 2% of the stock of the company in exchange for 
Plaintiffs agreement immediately to transfer the 250 thousand plus shares of Medicode stock. 
Plaintiff performed his part of this executory accord, Defendant has refused to do so. 
At the May 1991 meeting, Plaintiff believed that Defendant owed him $25,000.00 and that 
Defendant had failed to pay him within the first quarter of 1990 as agreed. Thus, Plaintiff believed 
in good faith that he had no obligation to turn the stock over to Defendant and maintained that 
Defendant had no right to immediate possession of the stock. Defendant, however, wanted the 
stock immediately. (R. 584; Add. 78). Accordingly, he entered into an agreement to pay Plaintiff 
$25,000.00 and hold 2% of Medicode stock in trust for Plaintiff. (R. 15, 590; Add. 15, 80). He 
knew that he could not get the stock unless he agreed to pay $25,000.00 and hold 2% of the stock. 
(R. 590; Add. 80). This agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction, which replaced the 
parties' original agreement Notwithstanding the facts, the trial court ruled that no consideration 
supported the accord and satisfaction because the parties were mutually mistaken with respect to 
the fact that Defendant still owed Plaintiff money. However, the fact that Plaintiffs belief was 
wrong does not vitiate the consideration in this case. A compromise of a bona fide dispute, even 
if not well-founded, constitutes consideration. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. 
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H. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NO 
CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED THE SUBSTITUTE AGREEMENT AND 
THAT THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
The fact that Defendant may not have actually owed Plaintiff money3 does not mean there 
was no consideration. The Supreme Court of Utah has stated in several cases that consideration 
. . . may consist of a compromise of a bona fide dispute which is not necessarily well-founded but 
is in good faith." In re Grimm, 784 P.2d at 1244 (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); Sugarhouse, 610 P.2d at 1372; Ashton v. Sheen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073 
(1935)). Thus, although a party may be mistaken about his position, when he gives up rights or 
compromises a bona fide dispute in good faith, consideration exists for the agreement reached in 
settlement of the dispute. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Golden Key Realty, Inc. is instructive. There, 
the plaintiff real estate broker sued for $18,000.00 allegedly due in commission from defendant. 
Defendant claimed that the parties had entered an accord and satisfaction and plaintiff had 
accepted $5,000.00. The plaintiff argued that there was no consideration for the accord and 
satisfaction. The court rejected the argument, declaring "where there is a bona fide dispute as to 
the amount due, sufficient consideration exists. It is not necessary for the dispute to be well 
founded, so long as it is in good faith." 699 P.2d at 733; see also Farmers & Merchants State Bank 
v. Higginsy 89 P.2d 916 (Kan. 1939) (the court held that extending time of payments was 
consideration for giving of a mortgage); Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242, 246-47 (Wyo. 1943) ("the 
3
 Plaintiff vigorously disputes that he was not owed money at the time of the meeting. 
Plaintiff also disputes that he was overpaid by Defendant. However, these findings of fact are not 
disputed on appeal. 
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doing of anything beyond what one is already bound to do, though of the same kind, and in the 
same transaction may be a good consideration"); Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 
P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) ("[i]t has long been held that . . . to do an act which one is 
not legally bound to perform, is usually a sufficient consideration for a contract based thereon . . 
."); Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm% 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976), ("[i]f one party asks for 
and receives something which he would not otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is 
adequate consideration"); Powers Restaurants, Inc. v. Garrison, 465 P.2d 761, 763 (Okla. 1970) 
("any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee" constitutes consideration). 
The evidence here establishes that Plaintiff settled a bona fide dispute, gave up rights that 
he believed he had, extended the time for payment, and did acts and conferred benefits which he 
did not believe he was legally bound to do. When the May 1991 agreement was executed, Plaintiff 
believed in good faith that Defendant owed him $25,000.00. (R. 505-07, 518-19, 532, 574; Add. 
64-66, 72-73, 75-76). Moreover, Plaintiff testified, and Defendant did not dispute in any way, that 
he was to have been paid the stock purchase money within the first few months of 1990. (R. 490-
91, 494, 506 line 25-507 line 5; Add. 58-59, 62, 65-66). The evidence clearly established that 
payments for the stock were not completed in the first few months of 1990. (R. 493-94, 506-07, 
382-83; Add. 61-62, 65-66, 52-53). Indeed, the testimony showed that the payments continued until 
at least September, 1990. (R. 257, f 4; Add. 43). Thus, when the parties met, Plaintiff believed, 
in good faith, that he had absolutely no obligation to sign the stock over to Defendant and that 
Defendant had breached the agreement by failing to pay as agreed. Indeed, Plaintiff believed that 
he had a right to rescind the agreement (R. 368-69, 382; Add. 48-49, 52). 
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Plaintiff testified that he would not have turned over the stock if Defendant had not given 
him $25,000.00 and agreed to hold 2% of the stock for him. (R. 518-519; Add. 72-73). Defendant 
concurred that the stock would not have been transferred without his agreeing to pay $25,000.00 
and executing the 2% note. (R. 590; Add. 80). Nonetheless, Plaintiff agreed to and did sign over 
the stock at the May 1991 meeting because Defendant agreed to pay $25,000.00 and hold 2% of 
the stock in trust for Plaintiff. Id. Thus, Plaintiff settled a bona fide dispute regarding the 
wrapping up of the sale of the stock. He agreed to accept 2% of the stock and $25,000.00 in 
settlement of Defendant's late payments. Moreover, he believed he was still owed money. By 
turning over the stock, he agreed to forego an action for breach based on late payments and did 
something he believed he had no duty to do. Because Plaintiff believed in good faith that he did 
not have to turn over the stock and that Defendant had breached the agreement, his agreement 
to do so constituted consideration even if his belief was mistaken. See In re Grimm, 784 P.2d at 
1244 (consideration may consist of a compromise of a bona fide dispute which is not necessarily 
well-founded but is in good faithV By surrendering the stock, which he did not believe in good 
faith that he had to do, in exchange for Defendant's promise to pay him $25,000.00 and hold 2% 
of the stock in trust for Plaintiff, Plaintiff settled a dispute and gave consideration for Defendant's 
promise. Defendant received a "definite statement of performance" on a disputed or uncertain 
claim; the Utah Supreme Court has held that is consideration. Sugarhouse, 610 P.2d at 1372. 
Defendant testified that the 2% agreement was merely security for the $25,000.00 check 
he gave Plaintiff on May 23, 1991. However, this testimony directly contradicts the writing, and 
the trial court should have barred the introduction of the evidence under the parole evidence 
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rule as Plaintiff requested. See EA. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144, 
146-47 (Utah 1974) ("parole evidence may not be given to change terms of a written agreement 
. . ."); see also R. 597 (Plaintiffs objection to Defendant's testimony). More importantly, the court 
did not find that the 2% agreement was merely a security agreement. Here, Defendant's testimony 
directly contradicted the writing and should not have been received. Contrary to the lower court's 
conclusion, even if Plaintiff was not owed money, there was consideration. Thus, there was 
consideration to support the May 1991 agreement, and the agreement was enforceable. 
m. EVEN IF NO CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED THE AGREEMENT, 
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM REFUSING TO 
HONOR THE AGREEMENT. 
Even assuming that no consideration supports Defendant's promise, it is enforceable under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In Glitsos v. Kadish, 418 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966), the 
court stated that even where a party has not given "consideration" a promise may be enforced 
under the doctrine of estoppel. Indeed, the court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to 
enforce a promise that was not supported by consideration. The Utah Supreme Court has also 
declared that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to enforce a promise in the context of 
an accord and satisfaction that is not supported by consideration. Sugarhouse, 610 P.2d at 1373. 
The Sugarhouse court pointed to promissory estoppel as an alternative ground for enforcing an 
accord and satisfaction challenged on the grounds that no consideration supported a party's 
promise. In Utah, the elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise reasonably expected to 
induce reliance, (2) reasonable reliance inducing action or forbearance on the part of the promisee 
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or a third person; and (3) detriment to the promisee or a third person. Id; Andreason v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993). 
Here, the elements are satisfied. First, Defendant promised in the May 1991 agreement 
to pay Plaintiff $25,000.00 and hold 2% of the stock in trust for Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff relied 
on this promise by signing over the stock at the meeting in which the agreement was reached and 
not bringing claims against Defendant for his initial breach. Plaintiff testified that he would not 
have signed over the stock without the agreement. (R. 518-519; Add. 72-73). Defendant likewise 
admitted that he would not have received the immediate delivery of the stock without making the 
promise to Plaintiff. (R. 590; Add. 80). Plaintiff believed that Defendant still owed him money 
and that he had failed to pay in the agreed time frame. Third, Plaintiff suffered detriment in that 
he gave up the stock and the right to sue for breach based on late payments. Accordingly, even 
if there is no consideration, Defendant should be estopped from refusing to honor his promise to 
pay $25,000.00 and hold 2% of the stock for Plaintiff. Defendant got what he wanted from his 
promise and should be compelled to honor it. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING 
DEFENDANT TO PURSUE A COUNTERCLAIM RAISED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON THE EVE OF TRIAL. 
Generally, a trial court's decision to grant a motion to amend the pleadings 
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not disturb such a 
decision unless an appellant establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Chadwick 
v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988); see also Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1983). Utah courts have clearly indicated, however, that motions to amend the pleadings 
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to include new or different causes of actions on the eve of trial are highly disfavored. Girard, 
660 P.2d at 248; Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988, 989 (Utah 1982) (upholding lower 
court's refusal to permit a defendant to amend the pleadings based on matters allegedly discovered 
the day before trial). Here, Defendant moved to amend the pleadings to include a counterclaim 
only at the end of trial and the motion clearly prejudiced Plaintiff. Thus, the court abused its 
discretion, and this court should reverse the decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that a party seeking to amend a pleading on the 
morning of trial must give an adequate reason for the motion's untimeliness, or it will be denied. 
See Girard, 660 P.2d at 248. Courts have frowned on amendments to the pleadings on the eve of 
trial because it "causes great disruption to the legal process and is unfair to an opponent who has 
conducted discovery, fully prepared the case, and scheduled trial based on the moving party's prior 
pleadings." See Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820. Indeed, the Chadwick court declared that while "leave 
to amend is liberally allowed in the interest of justice, ... justice is often uninterested in 
amendments alleging new and different causes of action on the eve of trial." Id. Here, the court 
should find that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Defendant to amend the 
pleadings to include a counterclaim on the day of trial for three reasons, each of which is sufficient 
in and of itself to require reversal: (1) Defendant has failed to give a reasonable explanation for 
failure timely to bring the counterclaim earlier; (2) Plaintiff was surprised and prejudiced by the 
court's allowing Defendant to amend the pleadings, and (3) Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant's 
pursuing a counterclaim. 
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A. Defendant Has No Reasonable Excuse for Failure to Amend the Pleadings 
to Include a Counterclaim Before the Day of Trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a motion to amend the pleadings on the 
eve of trial will not be granted unless the moving party can give an adequate reason for the 
untimeliness of the motion. Girard, 660 P.2d at 248.4 Here, Defendant has failed to give an 
adequate reason for failing to bring the motion in a timely fashion. Defendant attempted to 
explain the delay in bringing a motion to amend the pleadings by stating that he did not have the 
records on which he bases his counterclaim until just before trial because a former employee had 
"squirreled them away." (R. 450-51). In other words, Defendant had access to and control of the 
records that eventually supported his defense to Plaintiff's claim and his own counterclaim at all 
times relevant to this proceeding. The trial court refused to allow Defendant leave to amend to 
file a counterclaim three months earlier for the exact same reason, but then inexplicably allowed 
the counterclaim based on a motion at the end of trial. (R. 199, 193-97; Add. 29-34). This, 
despite the fact that Defendant did absolutely nothing in the interim to pursue the counterclaim 
or inform Plaintiff or the court of the counterclaim prior to the day of trial. Plaintiff did not keep 
any critical information from Defendant Rather, Defendant did not make adequate, if any, effort 
to located the alleged "new" evidence until just prior to trial. 
Were the court to find that Defendant's reason for failing to raise the counterclaim sooner 
was adequate, it would create a dangerous precedent and defeat the purposes of discovery. Parties 
could conceal critical documents and information and claims and defenses based thereon until just 
4
 The Girard court stated that the moving party's "inability to state an adequate reason for the 
untimeliness of the motion discloses that this is not a case where 'justice requires' an amendment." 
660 P.2d at 248. 
18 
prior to trial. Then, as here, the party could claim that they just "discovered" the information and 
based on the "new" information need to amend the pleadings to bring new claims and defenses. 
The court should reverse the lower court's ruling and firmly establish that a party's lack of 
diligence in discovering or deliberate efforts to conceal evidence will not be rewarded by the 
court's permitting last minute amendments to the pleadings. 
B. Plaintiff Was Surprised and Prejudiced by the Court's Permitting the 
Amendment. 
Plaintiff was prejudiced by the court's allowing the amendment in several important 
respects. First, Plaintiff made several strategical decisions that may have been affected by the 
existence of a counterclaim. Before he was aware that Defendant intended to pursue a 
counterclaim, Plaintiff waived his right to have the case tried to a jury instead of a judge. (R. 
181). Plaintiff may well have stuck by his demand for a jury trial had he known that he faced a 
counterclaim. Second, Plaintiff was not allowed to brief and argue to the court legal defenses 
such as waiver and estoppel to Defendant's counterclaim. Third, Plaintiff was given absolutely 
no opportunity to prepare to respond to a counterclaim, as he was notified of Defendant's 
intention to pursue the claim only at trial. Plaintiff was wholly unaware that the evidence of 
overpayment would be introduced to support a counterclaim. Fourth, the records which were 
introduced at trial to support the defense of payment and Defendant's counterclaim were in 
Defendant's custody and control at all times. Coincidentally, Defendant "discovered" important 
documents relating to claims and defenses on the eve of both the first trial date and the second 
trial date. In short, Plaintiff was given no time much less adequate time to prepare a defense 
to Defendant's claims that all of the payments were for stock. 
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C Plaintiff Did Not Consent to the Amendment of the Pleadings by Allowing 
in the Evidence Relating to Overpayment. 
Plaintiff did not consent or impliedly consent to the amendment of the pleadings by 
allowing the evidence of overpayment in without an objection. Plaintiff acknowledges that no 
objection was raised at trial when evidence going to overpayment was introduced. Plaintiff did 
not feel that such an objection was justified because Plaintiff knew that Defendant intended to 
introduce such evidence in defense of Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiffs assumption was reasonable in 
light of the fact that the court had expressly denied a motion for leave to file a counterclaim. 
The parties disputed the characterization of several payments from Defendant and companies he 
owned to Plaintiff. Defendant argued that all payments were for stock while Plaintiff disagreed. 
Plaintiff thought this evidence was to be introduced to prove Defendant's defense that payment 
had been made and no consideration existed for the May, 1991 agreement. This was a reasonable 
assumption; three months previous, the court had expressly refused to grant Defendant leave to 
file a counterclaim. (R. 199; Add. 34). Following that refusal, no motion was ever made, prior 
to the close of evidence, to bring a counterclaim. Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel did not believe 
that the evidence was being received for such a purpose. Even the motion at the close of 
evidence did not specify that Defendant sought permission to pursue a counterclaim. (R. 598; 
Add. 82). Certainly, Defendant's trial brief mentions that he intends to pursue a counterclaim, but 
it does not constitute a motion to amend the pleadings. Further, the trial brief was served on 
Plaintiff the day of trial. The only motion to amend the pleadings came at the close of trial and 
did not mention a counterclaim. 
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The California Supreme Court has decided a case on strikingly similar facts that can guide 
the court here. In Trafton v. Youngblood, 442 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1968), the plaintiff sued the 
defendant to recover money received in trust by the defendant for the plaintiff. The defendant 
had kept the money claiming that the plaintiff owed him the money. Defendant had pleaded "an 
account stated" as an affirmative defense. The evidence supporting the defense of an account 
stated also supported a counterclaim against the plaintiff, but the defendant had failed to plead a 
counterclaim. After trial, the defendant asked the court for leave to amend his answer to include 
a counterclaim, but the court denied the motion. Id. at 652-53. Defendant argued that the court 
erred in denying the motion. The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts denial, 
stating: 
[Ajmendments have been allowed with great liberality "and no abuse of discretion 
is shown unless by permitting the amendment new and substantially different issues are 
introduced into the case or the rights of the adverse party prejudiced. . . . 
It is frequently the case that evidence which is admissible to establish one issue 
may tend to establish another issue than that for which it is offered, and it is a 
rule that evidence so introduced is available to establish any of the issues in the 
case. The rule is, however, limited to the issues which are to be tried. If the other 
issue that the evidence may tend to establish is not before the court, the evidence must 
be limited to the actual issue. The fact of its introduction cannot be used to 
establish an issue that the parties have not made in their pleadings. The court 
would not be authorized to consider it as establishing an issue that was not before it 
at trial 
Id. at 658. 
Here, Defendant attempts to do the same thing that the defendant in Trafton attempted 
to do. In short, Defendant did not move to amend the pleadings until after the close of the 
evidence at trial. Yet, Defendant claims that Plaintiff consented to the inclusion of the 
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counterclaim by failing to object to the introduction of the evidence regarding overpayment at 
trial. Plaintiff did not object, however, not because he had consented to allowing Defendant to 
bring a counterclaim but because the evidence was introduced to defend against Plaintiffs claim, 
and Plaintiff knew that the evidence would be introduced for that purpose. As the Trafton court 
indicated, evidence frequently tends to establish more than one issue. However, evidence cannot 
be used to establish an issue that is not before the court Defendant's attempt to include a 
counterclaim does precisely that which is proscribed by the Trafton opinion. Evidence cannot 
establish an issue that is not before the court, and Defendant's counterclaim was not before the 
court at trial. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that no objection was raised to the introduction of the evidence, 
but maintains that this failure was justified for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff did not object 
to the introduction of evidence regarding payments because Plaintiff expected that evidence to be 
introduced to defend against Plaintiffs claim. Second, no objection could have been made because 
no motion was made to amend the pleadings to include the counterclaim until after the trial. 
Plaintiff should not have to speculate as to the purpose for introducing evidence and object to the 
introduction of evidence to prove a counterclaim before Defendant made any motion to raise the 
counterclaim. Even the motion to amend the pleadings at the close of the evidence did not 
specifically include the counterclaim. Thus, Plaintiff had to surmise-despite the court's express 
refusal to grant leave to file a counterclaim three months earlier and the fact that no motion had 
been made to include a counterclaim-that a counterclaim was before the court at trial. Plaintiff 
simply did not consent-impliedly or otherwise-to Defendant's bringing a counterclaim. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court reverse the lower 
court's ruling of no cause of action of Plaintiff complaint. The court should hold that 
consideration supported the agreement and the parties' interest or accord and satisfaction, or, in 
the alternative, that Defendant is estopped from denying his promise to hold 2% of the stock of 
Medicode for plaintiff. The Court should also reverse the trial court's award of $169,501.75 on 
Defendant's counterclaim. The amendment of the pleadings at trial to include a counterclaim was 
an abuse of discretion. 
DATED this 2(fe day of January, 1995. 
KERTON & McCONKIE 
By:<£§ 
SamlielIg7McV< 
Raildy T. Austin 
Attorneys for Plainti 
w-
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